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Abstract 
 
 
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in 
which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her 
nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development 
Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an Open sale after patenting this 
interim knowledge, or a Closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a 
competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU’s post-invention 
revenues. Both models lead to partial leakage of RU’s knowledge from it’s 
description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open 
sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed 
via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, 
generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale 
for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU’s 
incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her 
wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining. 
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Non-technical summary 
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in 
which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her 
nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development 
Units (DUs). We assume that description of knowledge results in a partial leakage. 
Due to the non-rival nature of knowledge, there is a risk that after disclosing to one 
DU, RU will further disclose the information to a competing DU. We consider two 
alternative mechanisms of selling the knowledge that create RU's commitment to 
exclusive disclosure: the “open sale” based on patenting the interim knowledge, and 
the “closed sale” where precluding further sales requires the RU to obtain a share in 
the licensed DU's post-invention revenues.  
 An open or patented sale provides legal support for exclusive disclosure, but it 
also involves leakage of a certain portion of the knowledge to the public in the 
process of filing a patent application. A closed sale helps to reduce such leakage, 
but the need for giving away a share of post-invention revenues to RU weakens the 
licensee DU's incentives to invest in development. We explicitly model the extensive 
form bargaining in both modes of disclosure, and find that the parties are more likely 
to choose the closed mode if the interim knowledge is very valuable. If the extent of 
leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic 
relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate 
R&D expenditures.  
 We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over 
the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU's incentives to create knowledge under alternative 
modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining. We 
assume non-alienability of human capital; control rights are defined as the rights to 
veto coalitions with third parties. This definition of control rights leads to a non-trivial 
tradeoff between costs and benefits of corporate venturing. If RU cedes control rights 
to the DU ex ante, RU may lose ex interim flexibility in choosing a more appropriate 
mode of disclosure. However, we show that even if corporate venturing is inefficient 
ex interim, it may improve RU’s ex ante incentives to invest in production of 
knowledge.  
 
1 Introduction
Our goals in this paper are two-fold. First, we attempt to contribute to the growing
literature on organization of research and development (R&D) activities within and among
firms, when the potential benefits of knowledge disclosure across them is of considerable
importance, but it is subject to problems of imperfect protection of the intellectual property
rights (IPR) assigned to (shared) interim innovative knowledge. We do so in an environment
that is rich enough to capture potential competition in R&D and in bargaining over interim
knowledge sales, as well as involuntary leakage or spillover of interim knowledge that is
described for its potential sale. We consider both patented open (o-)sales and privately
negotiated closed (c-) sales, by a first-stage research unit (RU) to one of two competing
second-stage Development Units (DUs). Both these DUs have the advantage of having
deep pockets, and thus of not requiring external financing for development expenditures
which may lead to a successful marketable invention with some probability. In contrast,
the RU with an innovative idea is assumed to have no interim wealth, and hence is better
oﬀ selling her knowledge rather than trying to develop it with external financing. The
rationale for this crucial assumption arises from the disincentive eﬀects of repayments to
external financiers, or revenue shares for RU knowledge licensors, on a developer’s choice
of eﬀort — or other non-contractible expenditures — to combine with the acquired interim
innovative knowledge to generate his probability of ultimate invention. Any probability of
a loss of post-invention revenues owing to multiple inventions by both the DUs gives rise
to a similar disincentive eﬀect, on their unverifiable development eﬀorts or expenditures.
We characterize the equilibrium and optimal choices of modes of sale or licensing of
interim research knowledge, under alternative ex ante assignments of Control Rights across
RU-DU pairs. These are interpreted more delicately than in the literature on Ownership
or Property Rights (Hart, 1995), developed for environments lacking the excludable public
good features of interim knowledge embedded in a research unit. Our notion of control
pertains to (not) allowing pre-bargaining coalition formation with outside parties by agents
in bilateral transactions, given wealth constraints of an agent who is either controlled by
the other agent or acts independently in her ex interim interests.
Our second major goal is to use our model to explore rationales for a claimed (albeit
somewhat preliminary) empirical regularity, pertaining to the relationship between the
“strength of IPR protection” in a patenting system and the level of overall expenditures
on R&D activities in an economy or sector. We focus on this for much of this paper
in the context of ex ante independence across the RU and DUs, arising often from the
unanticipated nature of many initial product ideas. Some theoretical models pertaining
to endogenous quality of innovation, imitation, and ease of second-stage research in a
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cumulative innovation process have suggested the possibility of a non-monotonic, indeed,
“inverted U-shaped” relationship between the strength of IPR-protection and R&D activity
in a sector or an economy, and a recent empirical study by Lerner (2001) provides some
support for this conjecture.1At the same time, as Gallini (2002) notes in a literature survey,
“these relationships are diﬃcult to model and test”. We develop just such a model, in which
the phenomenon of licensing interim knowledge is fully accounted for. The strength of IPR
protection is taken by us to be a technological parameter, arising from a leakage or spillover
coeﬃcient in the spirit of the Spence (1984) model. Such leakage of knowledge has quite
dramatically diﬀerent impacts on levels of development expenditures chosen by DUs who
choose to engage in open versus closed sales of diﬀerent levels of interim knowledge from
the RU, and on the incentive-feasibility of the closed mode of sale given an RU’s temptation
to behave in an opportunistic fashion and sell to another DU as well.2
As Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) have noted on the basis of survey data, outside
a small set of US industries “patents are considered less eﬀective relative to alternative
mechanisms for protecting intellectual assets, such as secrecy and lead times”(Gallini, 2002),
because of knowledge spillover to multiple DUs arising from the descriptions of innovations
involved in the patenting process. However, patenting also serves to “facilitate a market
for technological exchange” (Gallini, 2002) for exclusive licenses.3Important rationales for
these features are articulated in Teece (2000, page 22): “Patents are in one sense the
strongest form of intellectual property because they grant the ability to exclude, whereas
copyrights and trade secrets do not prevent firms that make independent but duplicative
discoveries from practicing their innovations and inventions”. In the context of interim
(non-marketable to consumers) innovative knowledge acquired by a DU from an RU, a non-
patented “exclusive” sale could thus be replicated to another DU, because he could then
(if successful in his subsequent invention) pretend to have acquired interim knowledge by
himself. This is especially likely to arise for interim innovative knowledge since often much
of it is Tacit, being non-codifiable in a documented form; as Teece (2000) notes elsewhere,
the “doctrine of equivalents” (of insubstantial diﬀerences), or of a similar “look and feel”,
are often applied much less stringently in trade secret or trademark litigation than in those
over patented innovations, applications for which now have to be in the public domain for
eighteen months in USA. This same feature of “tacitness” also makes such knowledge hard
to protect using IPR law (Teece, 2000), since description of its features leads to prospects
of innovating around the patent, causing a partial spillover of capabilities for second-stage
invention to the DUs receiving this description from an RU’s patent.
To counter an RU’s incentive to sell knowledge licensed in a closed sale to another DU,
we allow her to receive knowledge sales proceeds partially in the form of shares in the
licensee DU’s post-invention revenues. The value of the RU’s share must be suﬃciently
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diminished by the RU selling her interim knowledge to the other DU so as to preclude such
sales. While others such as Pisano (1989) have suggested a linkage between the co-ownership
of DU equity shares and preventing opportunistic knowledge leakage, we are the first to fully
analyze this mechanism and identify several novel, even surprising, features of it.4These
include the infeasibility of designing such an incentive scheme, for sub-domains of interim
knowledge levels (namely, for low levels of knowledge) which expand with the strength of
IPR protection. We also find that in a closed sale RU’s expected post-invention royalties
may decrease with respect to her knowledge level. Our findings have major implications for
DUs’ chosen levels of development expenditures, and the chosen mode of RU’s ex interim
knowledge sales, including RU-DU disagreements over it which would be resolved with
outcomes that depend on a DU’s ex ante control (or not) over the RU.5
Although we focus much of our analysis on ex interim interactions among an indepen-
dent RU and two competing DUs, a reasonable notion of the relevance of ex ante established
control rights over the RU may arise in our model, when RU is constrained by her interim
wealth from making transfers to a DU. This occurs despite our maintained assumption that
whether she is independent or under a DU’s control, as part of a Corporate Venture for
example,6the RU always retains the (possibly outside) option of patenting her knowledge.
Thereby, she may oﬀer an exclusive license for its full disclosure to one of the two competing
DUs for a lump-sum interim fee, which results in the licensee DU obtaining the same payoﬀ
as his rival DU having the knowledge leaked via the patent. A situation may nevertheless
arise in which the total net surplus across the RU and her licensee DU is greater in a closed
knowledge sale than in a patent-based open sale, but the extent of the share of a DU’s
post-invention revenue that must be given to the RU to preclude further sale to the other
DU is so high that either DU would strictly prefer the open-sale (patent-) based license,
whereas RU prefers a c-sale. Note that, since even a proposed closed sale by an RU requires
her to describe her interim knowledge to a DU, causing (by assumption) the same extent
of knowledge leakage to him as there would be to both DUs via a patent, forcing an open
sale is an option to such a DU as well, so that a DU has to obtain a weakly greater payoﬀ
in a closed sale in order to agree to licensing the RU’s knowledge via this mode of sale.
Now, if an independent RU could find a coalition partner with a somewhat deeper
pocket, she might be able to make an interim payment to a DU to compensate him suﬃ-
ciently for the share of revenue he must give to the RU cum her partner, in order to ensure
no further sale, so that he would agree to a closed sale in the scenario above. This would be
the case if the RU’s partner, who would obtain a part of this share to compensate her for
the interim payment to the DU which she finances, can ensure that the RU would choose
not to sell her interim knowledge to another DU based on their joint coalitional interest,
possibly using the threat of testifying against the RU if she clandestinely tried to violate
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her exclusive licensing contract with the first DU. Such a financial partner, a Venture Cap-
italist (VC), must thus have expertise and monitoring ability in this domain, as well as
reputational concerns arising from repeated partnerships of this kind. That would ensure
that she would act in the interest of her coalition with the RU, which is required for the
credibility of the exclusive closed sale.
While an alliance with such a VC partner aids both the wealth-constrained RU and her
licensee DU (weakly) ex interim, by making possible the realization of a closed sale with
higher overall (and individual) payoﬀs, it need not be in the ex ante interests of the DU.
The reason for this is, as we show later on, that the scenario above is more likely to arise
for lower levels of knowledge. Thus, it may lead to the RU preferring to generate such
lower levels of interim knowledge to sell in a closed sale rather than expending costly eﬀort
ex ante to generate higher levels of interim knowledge. Such adverse incentives for RU’s
knowledge generation might not arise if for low levels of her knowledge she could be forced
into open patent-based sales thereof, in which she would obtain lower payoﬀs than in closed
sales financed in part by a third-party VC partner. Ex ante DU control of an RU, whereby
the DU has claims to the first oﬀer of sale from the RU, and also veto power over any other
financial partners in their joint venture, could succeed in preventing the RU from utilizing
a financial partner to ensure a closed sale, for low levels of knowledge as in the scenario
above. Such an ex ante RU-DU “partnership” may build in flexibility regarding open versus
closed sales by giving the DU sizeable buyout options for RU’s shares, while setting high
prices for buy-ins by the RU to aid in closed sales in which she and her partner require a
very high share. It could also penalize a potential VC partner of its RU via litigation for
a “breach of contract”, suﬃciently so as to eliminate DU’s temptation to agree to some
c-sales, thus committing him not to renegotiate the terms of share sales ex interim.
Hence, a part of the predictions of our model, concerning DU-controlled corporate
ventures that would “combine” research cum development, is that such an institution would
on average generate more promising interim knowledge, enough to compensate the DU for
his cost of forming such a venture, including those of compensating “his” RU for her lower
revenue for low levels of knowledge, and for her eﬀort costs of generating greater knowledge
with higher probabilities. As a part of this process, for those knowledge levels at which
the controlling DU prefers an open sale or when a closed sale is (incentive-) infeasible,
we would expect to see buyouts of any ex ante RU-share in the joint venture by the DU,
which is very common in such equity-based ventures. Somewhat surprisingly, our rationale
would also predict that such corporate ventures would be more likely to patent their interim
knowledge than the independent RUs cum their VC partners, rather than transferring such
knowledge via closed sales in revenue-sharing partnerships in the development phase of
their innovations.7
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In this paper, we develop the full analysis of our model utilizing a simple algebraic
example in which interim knowledge and development “eﬀort” combine multiplicatively
via a Cobb-Douglas function with equal weights to generate the probability of a final
successful development. Both DUs choose their eﬀort taking into account (a) any sharing
of their ex post revenue with the RU, and (b) the knowledge level of the rival DU from
any leakage via a patent or as a licensee. Such a rival’s knowledge level would in turn
aﬀect his eﬀort choice, and hence the prospects for multiple second-stage inventions, which
would dissipate the rents of either inventor. These determine their incentives to incur eﬀort
(cum non-contractible development expenditures) in a Nash equilibrium. We proceed by
first considering the impact of knowledge leakage to the non-licensee DU in open sales,
and of the sharing of revenue with the RU in closed sales, on the total net surplus of
the combination of the RU and her licensee DU in these two modes of sale. We then
characterize the division of these surpluses across the RU and her licensee DU, utilizing
the major lessons of noncooperative bargaining theory beginning with Stahl (1977) and
Rubinstein (1982).8Finally, we examine the impact of RU’s interim wealth constraint on
this division, on the chosen mode of interim knowledge sales, and on RU’s incentives to
generate knowledge under varying assumptions regarding her independence.
2 Related literature
To place our model in the context of related literature, we now proceed to delineate several
key facets of its ongoing development, without trying to be exhaustive in its description,
before continuing to develop the salient features of our model. The formal modelling of
knowledge disclosure in the context of R&D began with two key papers, by Spence (1984)
on exogenous knowledge spillovers across competing firms (DUs), and by Bhattacharya and
Ritter (1983) on a RU cumDU voluntarily revealing part of its interim innovative knowledge
to investors to raise finance for development towards a marketable invention, but enhancing
the capabilities of its competing DUs in the process. Such endogenous disclosure, which
serves as a signal of ultimate invention prospects to investors, was assumed to be non-
contractible for licensing to other DUs. In later work, Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)
considered a more symmetric environment with two such RU cum DU firms which need
external finance, that may be provided by a common financier (or a capital market) or by
separate financiers. They showed that if a common financier learns enough about these
firms’ interim knowledge, he may for some parameters wish to transfer knowledge from
one of these to the other, which both of these firms would prefer ex ante provided that it
still leaves them suﬃcient incentives to do costly first-stage research. Bessen and Maskin
(2000) have also arrived at a similar result in the context of the desirability of (no) patent
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protection in cumulative R&D, assuming no overall rent dissipation in the event of joint
inventions, whereas Llobet, Hopenheyn and Mitchell (2000) have analyzed a compulsory
licensing scheme for the transfer of patent rights to later sole inventors in a stationary
Markovian environment.
The possibility of knowledge sale or licensing, even when disclosed knowledge can not
be verified by courts and its description causes full spillover to its receiver, was noted by
Anton and Yao (1994). They modelled an RU incapable of development who proposes
a closed sale of knowledge to a DU, and extracts a payment from him via the threat of
revealing this knowledge to another competing DU also if such a payment is not made. We
extend their analysis by explicitly modelling RU’s incentives in a setting where the spillover
of knowledge from its description is only partial. We describe a structure of knowledge
licensing fees that may rule out RU’s making a clandestine sale to another DU, which
would diminish the originally licensed DU’s prospects of being the sole or first inventor. At
the same time, we retain their assumption that the external financing needs of an RU who
might try to develop her interim knowledge, are suﬃciently great so as to generate grossly
inadequate incentives for her development “eﬀort” or non-contractible inputs, so that she
is better oﬀ selling her knowledge exclusively to one of the two competing DUs.9There may
also be other technological advantages of DUs over the RU in undertaking development,
e.g. sunk costs of shared facilities for development of similar products. Notice that the fact
that each DU develops multiple products (invented by diﬀerent RUs) naturally reinforces
our assumption of non-verifiable development eﬀort.10
The impact of knowledge licensing fees that are contingent on the licensee DUs’ post-
invention revenue on their development eﬀorts was modelled in Bhattacharya, Glazer and
Sappington (BGS, 1992), which developed a theory of ex ante optimal licensing fee contracts
— including those respecting interim wealth or verifiability constraints — for a research joint
venture (RJV) across several RU cum DU firms. Related results on the scope of patents,
and its impact on the sharing of revenues and thus on research eﬀorts in a multi-researcher
cumulative R&D environment, were developed by Chang (1995) and by Green and Scotch-
mer (1995). BGS had assumed that the quality of any interim knowledge exchanged via a
possibly non-exclusive license is verifiable in courts, following a final invention by a licensee.
Subsequent papers on collaborative R&D — in which first-stage research and second-stage
development may yield fruit via separate entities — has tried to relax this assumption to
incorporate interim bargaining subject to constraints arising from ex ante property or con-
trol rights. These have built on the formalization of Incomplete Contracts and “hold up”
problems in the papers of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), who
built on and extended insights in the works of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and of
Williamson (1971, 1976).
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An early application of this type of modelling to R&D was contained in Aghion and
Tirole (1994), which analyzed knowledge licensing fees and their implications for incentives
to expend non-contractible eﬀorts or invest in research and development, by a RU incapable
of development and a DU incapable of first-stage research. They reached conclusions similar
to those of Hart and Moore (1990), regarding the optimal allocation of control rights to the
RU versus the DU, under the (strong) assumption that under DU control RU is induced to
disclose all its knowledge for no incremental rewards, whereas an independent RU obtains
the Rubinstein (1982) non-cooperatively bargained share of any revenues arising from the
final invention if it occurs, which in turn diminishes the DU’s ex interim development
incentives.11In our work, we follow Hart (1995) who assumes absolute inalienability of
human capital.12The latter should surely extend to knowledge embedded in persons in a
research unit, which they may well threaten not to disclose as part of a process of bargaining
with potential developers thereof. Our definition of DU’s control rights over RU is thus
closely related to Hart and Moore (2004), in which ex ante contracts rule out a subset of
ex interim negotiations in order to improve ex ante incentives.
Subsequent authors, such as Dasgupta and Tao (1998), Tepperman (2000), and Rosen-
kranz and Schmitz (1999), have attempted to incorporate more key features specific to an
R&D setting within this type of (Grossman-Hart-Moore) property rights-based framework.
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999, 2002) consider collaborative R&D ventures in which each
partner makes decisions regarding both her non-contractible eﬀort as well as her knowledge
disclosure to her partner(s). However, their key notion of a common asset — which its
owner may deny the other partner access to as a bargaining threat — is quite abstract
in an R&D context. Moreover, in the two levels of knowledge and outcomes setting of
their model, the ex ante optimal “complete contracting” licensing fees of Bhattacharya,
Glazer, and Sappington (1992) — those respecting interim zero-wealth constraints — could be
implemented via the threat of competition by the licensor rather than exclusive production
by the licensee in the event of ultimate inventions by both, which is analogous to the threat
used to extract knowledge licensing fees in Anton and Yao (1994).13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we set up our model,
describing its timing and notation, and provide a preview of some of our results later. In
Section 4 we characterize the equilibrium mode of disclosure. In Section 5 we study the
relationship between IPR protection and overall R&D activity, aggregated over varying
levels of interim knowledge. In Section 6 we consider the role of RU’s interim financial
constraints, and provide a rationale for corporate venturing by a DU. Section 7 concludes.
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3 The model
3.1 The setup
There are three risk neutral agents: a research unit RU and two competing development
units DU1 and DU2. We assume, until Section 6, that RU is not controlled by either DU.
These parties undertake research (by RU) and development (by DUs) to create a new
product. The investments in research and development are sequential. First, research is
undertaken in order to produce knowledge K. This knowledge has no value per se, but is
an input in the development stage which may result in the creation of a new product. If
only one DU develops successfully, he obtains a monopoly rent of V = 1 in the product
market. If two DUs succeed in development, they compete a la Bertrand and both get zero
rents. The interim knowledge K ∈ [0, 1] depends on RU’s eﬀort e. The c.d.f. of knowledge
G(K; e) is decreasing in eﬀort e. For each DU, his probability P of successful development
is a function of his acquired knowledge and subsequent development eﬀort E ∈ [0, 1/2] :14
P = p(K,E) =
√
2KE. (1)
Both research and development eﬀorts e and E are measured in terms of their costs. These
are assumed non-verifiable. Knowledge is metrized in terms of the maximum probability of
successful second-stage invention it could lead to. The constraint E ≤ 1/2 is to make sure
that this probability cannot exceed 1. However, in all equilibria considered in the paper
E ≤ K/2 = argmaxE
h√
2KE −E
i
, so that this constraint is never binding.
The timing of events is as follows:
Ex ante. RU undertakes eﬀort e.
Ex interim. The RU and the DU(s) to which she makes a licensing oﬀer, with a
description of knowledge, infer the level of knowledge K produced in the research stage.
The exact content of RU’s knowledge is not observed by either DU and requires further
disclosure. The parties, RU and DU(s), choose the mode of disclosure and bargain about
the licensing fee. Their bargaining proceeds as an alternating oﬀer game with an outside
option of registering IPR (open mode). Once a patent is registered, there is no return to
the closed mode. The two alternative modes of knowledge disclosure are as follows:
In the open mode, a patent (IPR) is registered, so that RU can commit to sell her
knowledge to one party only.15This requires describing RU’s knowledge publicly which
involves a partial leakage of her knowledge; a proportion L ∈ [0, 1] of the knowledge K is
disclosed to both DUs. The bargaining game is similar to the one in Bolton and Whinston
(1993). RU and the DUs bargain about disclosure of full knowledge K. RU makes an oﬀer
to DUi. DUi either accepts the oﬀer or makes a counter-oﬀer. If RU rejects the counter-
oﬀer, she makes an oﬀer to DUj and so on. DU1,2 then choose their post-licensing levels
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of development eﬀort (equivalently, their probabilities of successful development). We will
denote Pi = Po as the probability of development for the firm that acquires full knowledge
K, and Pj = Qo as the probability of development for the firm that develops on the basis of
leaked knowledge LK. These are chosen as Nash equilibrium strategies in the game between
the two DUs, in which the payoﬀ of V = 1 arises ex post only for a DU which invents alone.
In the closed mode, disclosure occurs through a private sale to one of the DUs (randomly
chosen by an independent RU). The parties bargain about a lump-sum transfer from DUi to
RU as well as about RU’s share s (e.g. via royalties) in DUi’s post invention revenues. After
RU and DUi agree on the terms of disclosure, DUi chooses his development eﬀort Ei. We
denote Pc as his corresponding probability of invention. RU could also disclose knowledge
to DUj subsequently. In this opportunistic deviation by RU, she would first describe her
knowledge causing leakage LK (for symmetry’s sake) to DUj. DUj would then choose the
probability of development Pd given the DUi’s choice of Pc. If RU and DUj disagreed on
the licensing fee, DUj would develop on the basis of leaked information; in this case we
denote his choice of probability of invention as Qd. By choosing s appropriately, DUi will
try to preclude such disclosure to DUj. If s is suﬃciently high, RU could be interested in
protecting DUi’s ex post rents from competition; we characterize when this is feasible.
Ex post. Successful developers compete a la Bertrand. If only one DU invents success-
fully, he obtains a monopoly rent of V = 1. If both develop successfully then both get zero,
which is also their payoﬀ if neither invents.
It is important that registering IPR is an outside option for both RU and the DU that
is oﬀered a closed knowledge sale. The RU has this option by definition. On the other
hand, DUi may also force RU to register the patent by making non-serious oﬀers after RU
has described her knowledge. Certainly, RU may choose to switch to negotiating with DUj.
However, the latter strategy will not increase RU’s payoﬀ relative to an open sale; since
RU has described knowledge during the prior negotiations, DUi has already obtained LK.
We assume that courts can observe and verify ex post revenues but not the interim
knowledge K, or the “eﬀort” expenditures e and Ei,j. We also assume equal bargaining
power in bilateral bargaining between a DU and an RU.
We will denote as Tc and To the total equilibrium ex interim expected surplus of RU
cum the licensee DU obtaining the full knowledge in the closed and in the open mode,
respectively. Similarly, Fc and Fo are the full licensing fees that this DUi pays RU in these
modes. We will denote as Z(Pi, Pj;K) the expected ex interim payoﬀ of this DU in the
development race where the other DUj chooses probability of invention Pj. According to
(1), DUi’s eﬀort cost is Ei = P 2i /(2K) so that in the open mode of knowledge sale:
Zo(Pi, Pj;K) = [(1− Pj)Pi − P 2i /(2K)− Fo] (2)
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Figure 1: Joint surplus as a function of K under open (To, dotted line) and closed (Tc, solid
line) modes, for L = 0.4 (thick black lines), L = 0.1 (medium, red), and L = 0 (thin,blue).
The right graph is a closeup for K ∈ [0.7, 1].
which increases in K and decreases in Pj. Since Fo is paid before the development eﬀort is
chosen, the DUi’s payoﬀ (2) is maximized at Pi = K(1−Pj). The competing DUj develops
on the basis of leaked knowledge LK; he maximizes his payoﬀ by choosing Pj = LK(1−Pi).
Correspondingly, in the closed model of knowledge sale:
Zc(Pi, s;K) = [(1− s)Pi − P 2i /(2K)− {Fc − sPc}] (3)
where Pc is the optimal choice of Pi in this mode. Again, the cash payment {Fc − sPc} is
made before the choice of development eﬀort, so DUi chooses Pi = K(1− s) to maximize
(3).
3.2 Preview of some results
We find that, except in situations where the required revenue share of the RU in a closed
sale is very high, the ordering of Tc versus To determines the chosen mode of sale. This
ordering depends crucially on the level of the knowledge leakage parameter L, as well as
on the level of the interim knowledge K itself. Depending on this parameter, the curve
Tc(K;L), as a function of interim knowledge level K, may lie everywhere below or above
the To(K;L) curve, or cross it once from below. However, as we have noted above, the
Tc(K;L) curve may not exist — closed sales may not be incentive-feasible — for knowledge
levelsK below a certain level. This non-existence region is larger when the leakage/spillover
coeﬃcient L is smaller, as depicted in Figure 1.
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We also find that the impact of smaller leakage or higher IPR protection on Tc(K,L)
and To(K,L) are very diﬀerent; Tc(K,L) is everywhere increasing in L for all K, whereas
the impact of increasing L on To(K,L) goes in the exact opposite direction. To evaluate the
impact of changing L on overall development activity, one must also take into account the
impact of increasing L on the probability of successful sole second stage development by
non-licensees in open sales, who gain from knowledge spillover via patenting. This mode
is chosen in the subset of interim knowledge levels K for which the closed mode either
does not exist or is dominated by the open mode To(K,L) > Tc(K,L). Thus, it is quite
a complex task to evaluate the impact of changing L on the overall probability of induced
interim development expenditures, for a given cross-sectional or cross-sectoral distribution
of interim knowledge levels K, and also of L itself perhaps.16
We accomplish this task, so as to investigate the conditions for an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the strength of IPR protection, parameterized as (1−L), and the levels
of and invention prospects arising from overall R&D (here just development) expenditures.
In our model, the fact that Tc(K,L) either decreases or may fail to exist for a larger range
of K when (1 − L) rises, is an important source of the potential non-monotonicity of the
impact of IPR protection on overall development eﬀorts cum prospects. The forces giving
rise to these results arise from economic eﬀects which transcend the specifics of the algebraic
cum numerical example we use to demonstrate these, as we argue below while discussing
the economic intuition behind our main results.
4 Choosing between alternative modes of disclosure
In this Section we characterize the equilibrium payoﬀs of the RU and the DUs under the
alternative modes of disclosure at the ex interim stage. First, we derive the joint surplus of
the RU and her licensee DUi in the two modes of disclosure. Then we study the outcome
of bargaining and describe the division of this surplus between RU and DUi.
4.1 Open mode
If a patent is registered then (the exclusive licensee) DUi pays RU a licensing fee Fo (for
‘open’) and obtains knowledge K. At the same time, knowledge LK is leaked to the public
domain, so the competing DUj can also engage in the development race. The joint surplus
of RU and DUi will therefore equal To = [Zo + Fo]; see (2). The competing DUj will use
the leaked knowledge LK, and will therefore receive [(1 − Po)Qo − Q2o/(2LK)]. Here the
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probabilities Po, Qo satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions:
Po = argmax
p
£
(1−Qo)p− p2/(2K)
¤
= K(1−Qo)
Qo = argmax
q
£
(1− Po)q − q2/(2LK)
¤
= LK(1− Po)
Straightforward calculations yield:
Po =
K − LK2
1− LK2 ; Qo =
LK − LK2
1− LK2 . (4)
Note that Po is increasing inK for all L, while Qo is initially increasing and then decreasing
in K, approaching the limit of Qo = 0 as K → 1 for all L < 1.
The fee F0 is determined as the outcome of the alternating oﬀer bargaining game de-
scribed in the Section 3.1.
Lemma 1 In the open mode the licensing fee sets the licenses DUi to his disagreement
payoﬀ: either DU obtains the net payoﬀ of Zo = [(1− Po)Qo −Q2o/(2LK)], whereas RU
obtains Fo = [{Po(1−Qo)− P 2o /(2K)}− {(1− Po)Qo −Q2o/(2LK)}] from DUi.
Proof. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game is as follows. RU
always oﬀers the fee above to DUi. DUi accepts the oﬀer, because he knows that RU will
not agree to a counter-oﬀer that reduces her payoﬀ, since DUj will agree to the payoﬀ Zo
after paying this fee when she is oﬀered the license next. Similar reasoning holds for DUj.
Essentially, this bargaining results in Bertrand competition between the two DUs: RU
extracts all the additional surplus of the licensed DU, making his participation constraint
binding. The intuition for this result is related to the nature of patented IPR: RU holds
full rights for an exclusive sale, and can choose whom to sell her knowledge to.
Using (4) we obtain the equilibrium payoﬀs of the RU and DU:
To =
K(1− LK)2
2 (1− LK2)2
; Fo =
K(1− L)
2 (1− LK2); Zo = To − Fo =
K(1−K)2L
2 (1− LK2)2
. (5)
Both To(K,L) and Fo(K,L) increase in K and decrease in L for all K,L ∈ [0, 1]. On the
other hand, either DU’s payoﬀ Zo increases with L. Indeed, the licensee DU receives her
reservation utility which is equal to the payoﬀ of a non-licensed DU; the latter clearly
increases when the proportion of knowledge that is leaked increases. However, unlike To
and Fo, each DU’s payoﬀ Zo is first increasing and then decreasing in K, approaching zero
as K −→ 1 for all L < 1.
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4.2 Closed mode
If the contracting parties do not register a patent but choose disclosure via a closed sale,
there is no leakage to outsiders in equilibrium. However, in order to provide RU with
incentives not to disseminate knowledge to the competing DUj, DUi has to give away a
suﬃcient share s of his ex post revenues in royalties to RU, so that:
sPc − sPc(1− Pd) ≥
¡
(1− Pc)Pd − P 2d /(2K)
¢
−
¡
(1− Pc)Qd −Q2d/(2LK)
¢
. (6)
The left-hand side in (6) is the reduction in the RU’s share in DUi’s revenue due to op-
portunistic disclosure to DUj. The right hand side is the maximum licensing fee that RU
may extract from DUj in case she decides to disclose to him after licensing her knowledge
to DUi. The logic of calculating this licensing fee is very similar to the one in open sales:
since the process of negotiating the fee results in a partial leakage of knowledge LK, RU
can obtain from DUj at most the expression in the right-hand side. RU’s incentives for
exclusive disclosure come from the fact that selling the knowledge to a competing DUj
dilutes the DUi’s payoﬀs, and thus reduces the value of RU’s stake from sPc to sPc(1−Pd)
as described in (6).
While giving a suﬃciently high share of ex post revenues to RU rules out opportunistic
disclosure, it comes at a cost of lowering the licensed DU’s incentives to apply eﬀort. Indeed,
by solving for optimal eﬀort of DUj and DUi we find that Pc decreases in s :
Pd = argmax
p
£
(1− Pc)p− p2/(2K)
¤
= K(1− Pc); (7)
Qd = argmax
q
£
(1− Pc)q − q2/(2LK)
¤
= LK(1− Pc); (8)
Pc = argmax
p
£
(1− s)p− p2/(2K)
¤
= K(1− s). (9)
In equilibrium, RU and DUi will choose the minimum possible s ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies
(6). Cancelling the sPc terms on in the left hand side of (6) and using (7) and (8), we rewrite
the incentive constraint as sPcPd ≥ [K(1− Pc)2/2− LK(1− Pc)2/2] . By substituting (7)
and (9) into (6), we obtain
sK(1− s) ≥ (1−K(1− s)) (1− L)/2; (10)
or, for all K > 0
2s2 − (1 + L)s+ (1− L)(1/K − 1)] ≤ 0 (11)
Since the parties are interested in finding the lowest s that still satisfies (6), we need to
solve for the smaller root of the quadratic equation obtained by setting (11) to equality.
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Lemma 2 A mechanism for a closed knowledge sale, which is incentive-compatible for no
further disclosure by the RU, requires RU to be given a (minimum) share s = s∗(K;L) in
her licensee DU’s post-invention revenues, where s∗(K;L) satisfies:
s∗(K;L) =
³
1 + L−
p
(1 + L)2 − 8(1− L)(1/K − 1)
´
/4 < 1/2. (12)
The licensee DU develops with probability Pi = Pc = K(1−s∗(K;L)), the other DU does not
develop. This closed mode is only feasible if such s∗(K;L) exists, i.e., whenever K ≥ bK(L),
where
bK(L) = µ1 + (1 + L)2
8(1− L)
¶−1
. (13)
This result is intuitive; the monopoly development rents of DUi suﬃce to overcome
RU’s temptation to disclose to the other DU whenever the level of interim knowledge is
high enough. If K < bK(L) then the private disclosure to one DU cannot be arranged
because of the adverse incentive eﬀect on DU’s eﬀort. In order to increase the RU’s stake,
DUi gives RU a higher share s. However, as s increases, DUi’s eﬀort decreases, so that Pc
falls. Hence, the competing DUj is prepared to pay more for the knowledge: the lower Pc,
the higher the payoﬀ to DUj’s eﬀort. At lower levels of interim knowledge, K < bK(L),
RU’s returns to opportunistic disclosure (the right-hand side in (6)) increase in s so rapidly
that the benefits of keeping DUi a monopoly (the left-hand side in (6)) never catch up with
it. Since Pc = K(1− s), sPc reaches its maximum at s = 1/2, implying s∗(K;L) ≤ 1/2.
Whenever the closed mode is incentive-feasible, the RU’s share s∗(K;L) decreases with
K and with L. The higher K, the higher the payoﬀ to the monopoly development. Since
higher K increases the probability of successful development, if there were two competing
developers there would be a high cost of ex post rent dissipation due to Bertrand compe-
tition. Therefore RU has incentives not to disclose to the second DU even if her share s is
small. Nevertheless, the value of RU’s stake in post-invention revenues sPc decreases in K.
Indeed, whenever s = s∗(K;L) exists, s = s∗(K;L) decreases in K, and so that right-hand
side of (10) decreases in K. Therefore the left-hand side sK(1− s) = sPc also decreases in
K. The joint surplus of RU and DUi
Tc = Pc − P 2c /(2K) = K
¡
1− s∗(K;L)2
¢
/2 (14)
is increasing in K. This joint surplus is concave in K and approaches K/2 as K increases;
although s∗(K;L) decreases in K, its rate of decrease slows down at higher levels of K.
The closed mode is more sustainable when the leakage is high; indeed, RU’s payoﬀ
from a deviant second sale declines when L increases, so that bK(L) decreases in L frombK(0) = 8/9 to bK(1) = 0. Also, the higher the leakage, the more eﬃcient the closed mode.
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If L is higher, RU can receive less from the competing DUj; her opportunistic disclosure
is less attractive. Hence, DUi can give RU a lower share of ex post revenues; therefore his
development eﬀort and probability of successful development Pc rise. This also results in
a higher joint surplus Tc. Unlike in the open mode where the joint surplus of RU and the
licensed DUi decreases in leakage L, joint surplus Tc in the closed mode increases with L.
4.3 Ex interim optimal mode of disclosure
The parties choose the mode that maximizes the ex interim joint surplus of RU and her
licensee DU.17In this subsection, we show that the closed mode dominates the open mode
if L and K are suﬃciently high. In the next subsection we solve for the bargaining outcome
in the closed mode when it is chosen.
If IPR are protected well (L is low) then the open mode dominates the closed mode.
Indeed, if L is close to zero then the joint surplus of RU and DUi is not undermined by
the competing development unit DUj; ex interim joint surplus To is equal to its maximum
maxp[P −P 2/(2K)] = K/2. Moreover, for low L the risk of opportunistic disclosure in the
closed mode is high, so DUi has to give RU a very high revenue share; hence his probability
of successful development is lowered. As IPR protection decreases and L rises, open sales
become less eﬃcient, while closed sales produce a higher surplus to RU and licensee DUi.
In order to see why the closed mode is more eﬃcient for high K, let us consider the
case where K is suﬃciently close to 1. If K → 1, then (5) and (14) imply Tc → [12K− (1−
K)2K
2
¡
1−L
1+L
¢2
]; To → [12K − (1−K)
L
1−L ]. Therefore for any L > 0, there exists a range of
K suﬃciently close to 1 such that Tc > To. The higher K the more valuable the monopoly
DU’s rent, hence the threat of opportunistic disclosure in the closed mode is less important.
On the other hand, if K is quite low, K < bK(L), then a private sale to one DU is infeasible
(s∗(K;L) does not exist), so the open mode is chosen.
It turns out that for any given L the functions Tc(K) and To(K) cross at most once.
As fine-grid numerical calculations show, for any K < 1µ
∂Tc
∂K
− ∂To
∂K
¶¯¯¯¯
Tc=To
> 0.
There can be three cases (Figure 1). First, there is a case where the closed mode is
more eﬃcient whenever s∗(K) exists: Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ bK(L). This case holds for
L ∈ [0.25, 0.91].18In the second case the structure is diﬀerent: atK being bK(L) or somewhat
higher, the open mode dominates. This case occurs when L is very low L ∈ (0, 0.25) or L
is very high L > 0.91. If L is very low, the open mode is by definition more eﬃcient. If L
is very high then the threshold level of knowledge bK(L) is so low that at K = bK(L) DUi
has to give RU a very high share in revenues which makes the closed mode suboptimal.
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Figure 2: The optimal mode of disclosure (in CAPS) as a function of K and L. The (K,L)
space is partitioned by two curves bK(L) (lower line) and K∗(L) (upper line). For a given L,bK is the minimum level of knowledge for which the closed mode exists, K∗ is the minimum
level at which the closed mode dominates the open mode. The two curves coincide for all
L ∈ [0.25, 0.91] .
As K increases above bK(L), Tc grows faster than To, and eventually overtakes it at some
point K∗(L) ∈ ( bK(L), 1). As K increases further, the closed mode remains more eﬃcient
Tc > To up until K = 1. The third case is that of perfect IPR protection L = 0. In this
case, the open mode is always optimal: To = K/2 > Tc for all K < 1.
All the three cases can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 If the closed mode of knowledge sale is more eﬃcient for some eK, then it
is also more eﬃcient for all K ≥ eK. Denoting K∗ as the minimum level of knowledge for
which the closed mode dominates the open mode, we have that: Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ K∗,
while if K < K∗ the closed mode either does not exist, or is dominated by the open mode
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Tc < To. As discussed above, such K
∗ exists with K∗(L) ≥ bK(L), and the inequality binds
for L ∈ [0.25, 0.91].
Figure 2 presents K∗ and bK as functions of L. Notice that both bK(L) and K∗(L)
decrease with L. In the areas where K ∈
³ bK(L),K∗(L)´, closed mode exists but is
dominated by the open mode. The figure shows that these domains are small relative to
the regions where closed mode dominates the open mode (K > K∗(L)) or where closed
mode is not incentive-feasible (K < bK(L)). This emphasizes the importance of studying
alternative modes of disclosure and especially the analysis of incentive-feasibility of the
closed mode.
4.4 Ex interim bargaining in the closed mode
Once the research stage is complete, RU and the licensee DUi bargain over the disclosure
fee in their chosen mode. As argued above, each party holds an outside option of switching
to the open mode of knowledge sale. Once the IPR is registered, in the form of a patent,
the two parties cannot return to private sales. We ignore RU’s interim wealth constraint.
The bargaining is a conventional alternating oﬀer game (like in Rubinstein, 1982) where
each party has an outside option with payoﬀs {Fo, To − Fo} to RU and DUi, respectively.
Lemma 3 The outcome of the bargaining game is as follows. The RU and her licensee
DUi choose the mode of disclosure that maximizes their joint surplus. If To > Tc then the
RU and DUi’s payoﬀs are {Fo, To − Fo} . If To ≤ Tc, then their payoﬀs are as follows©
Tc
2
, Tc
2
ª
if Tc
2
≥ Fo and Tc2 ≥ To − Fo
{Fo, Tc − Fo} if Tc2 < Fo
{Tc − To + Fo, To − Fo} if Tc2 < To − Fo
The formulas above are very intuitive. Eﬃcient bargaining implies maximization of the
joint surplus which is split in equal proportions as long as the outside options do not bind.19
The solution above neglects the RU’s ex interim financial constraint. We assume that
RU’s payoﬀ Fc consists of a stake in DUi’s revenues worth sPc, and a lumpsum transfer
Fc− sPc. If RU is financially constrained, then one needs to take into account the fact that
this transfer cannot be negative, Fc − sPc ≥ 0. In this Section we assume that since RU is
independent, she could sign a contract with an outside venture financier that can relax her
financial constraint. We discuss this financing arrangement in more detail in Section 6.
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5 IPR protection and overall R&D expenditures
In this Section we study the relationship between IPR protection proxied by (1− L) and
the aggregate development eﬀort in the economy. Our model accounts for a number of
countervailing eﬀects, some of which have not been discussed before in the literature.
We first consider the role of IPR protection given the mode of disclosure. If the knowl-
edge is disclosed through open sales then better IPR protection (A) improves the incentives
to develop for the licensee DUi, but also (B) weakens non-licensee DUj’s incentives. Given
K, the total development eﬀort by DU1 and DU2 in the open mode is
Eo = Ei +Ej =
P 2o
2K
+
Q2o
2LK
=
K
2
(1− LK)2 + L(1−K)2
(1− LK2)2
.
Lemma 4 In our symmetric Cobb-Douglas case, total development eﬀort in the open
(patent-based) mode of knowledge sales Eo, either monotonically decreases with IPR pro-
tection 1−L (for K ≤ 1/3) or has a U shape (if K > 1/3) with the minimum point of the
U-shape L = (3K−1)K−2(3−K)−1 shifting from L = 0 to L = 1 as K increases from 1/3
to 1.20
This result is explained by the relative strength of the countervailing eﬀects of IPR
protection on licensee and non-licensee eﬀorts. If IPR protection is strong (L = 0) then
a small decrease in it has a greater impact on DUj than on DUi so the eﬀect (B) is more
important. The positive eﬀect (A) on the licensee DUi is relatively more important if K is
high (and therefore the diﬀerence between K and LK is high).
In the closed mode, DUj does not develop in equilibrium. The threat of opportunistic
disclosure makes DUi give RU a higher share in post-invention revenues which distorts
DUi’s development eﬀort. The higher the leakage L, the less important this threat, hence
RU’s incentive constraint is satisfied through a lower revenue share s. As a result, Pc and
development eﬀort decrease as IPR protection (1−L) increases for all K for which s∗(K;L)
exists.
There is yet another eﬀect of IPR protection on the aggregate level of investment in
development. If L becomes suﬃciently high, parties switch from open to closed mode which
at the margin results in lower eﬀort. Indeed, consider the case of L < 0.25 or L > 0.91. In
this case, the switching occurs at the point where Tc = To. At this point, the total cost of
development is greater in the open mode: by definition, Tc = sPc+(1− s)Pc−P 2c /(2K) =
Pc(1 + s)/2 = To = Po(1 − Qo)/2. Since the total eﬀort in the closed mode (1 − s)Pc/2
is below Pc(1 + s)/2, it is also below Po(1 − Qo)/2 + (1 − Po)Qo/2 which is the total
eﬀort in the open mode. In the case L ∈ [0.25, 0.91], switching occurs at K = bK(L), and
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³ bK(L);L´ > To ³ bK(L);L´, so more cumbersome calculations are required. Still, after
substituting K = bK(L) and s∗ ³ bK(L);L´ = (1 + L)/4 – its maximum possible value –
into expressions for total eﬀort in open and closed mode we find that switching to closed
mode also reduces total eﬀort, at the level of knowledge K = bK(L).21To summarize, we
have:
Proposition 2 There are four eﬀects of stronger IPR protection on the total eﬀort by
DUs: (A) eﬀect on the licensee’s eﬀort in the open mode (positive); (B) eﬀect on the non-
licensee’s eﬀort in the open mode (negative); (C) eﬀect on the DU’s eﬀort in the closed
mode (negative); (D) eﬀect of switching from closed to open mode (positive). The latter
two eﬀects are associated with the closed mode and are therefore relatively more important
for higher knowledge levels K, and for lower levels of IPR protection (1− L).
As shown above, in the open mode total non-contractible development expenditures as
a function of (1−L) may be monotonic or U-shaped but it never has an inverted U-shape.
Therefore the “inverted U-shape” relationship cannot be produced by the eﬀects (A) and
(B) alone. Once the closed mode is introduced, so the eﬀects (C) and (D) are added,
the inverted U-shape may indeed emerge for a broad range of parameters. Suppose that
the following conditions hold: the outcomes in the open mode mostly result in a negative
eﬀect of IPR protection on the development expenditures; eﬀect (B) prevails over (A). In the
closed mode, positive eﬀect (D) dominates negative eﬀect (C). Both possibilities arise when
the prospects for higher levels of K are not too high. Then as IPR protection declines from
perfect, the development expenditures first rise (open mode eﬀect); when IPR protection
becomes suﬃciently weak, closed mode eﬀects are more important, hence investment start
to decline (due to (D)). Below we consider a numerical example where introduction of the
closed mode can indeed produce an inverted U-shape relationship between IPR strength
and the aggregate development expenditures.
In order to capture the eﬀect of ‘going public’ (D), our example has to depart from
studying the relationship at a given K; rather, we consider a continuous distribution of
diﬀerent knowledge levels K. For simplicity’s sake, we consider a family of exponential
distributions on K ∈ [0, 1] :
g(K) =
λe−λK
1− e−λ (15)
The extreme cases of this family are the uniform distribution for λ = 0 and a distribution
with a mass point at K = 0 at λ = ∞. The higher the value of λ, the lower the average
knowledge level EK =
R 1
0
Kg(K)dK = λ−1 −
¡
eλ − 1
¢−1
.
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Figure 3: The thick line shows the aggregate development expenditures E1 + E2 as a
function of IPR protection (1−L) given the equilibrium (i.e. ex interim privately optimal)
mode of disclosure. The thin line is the aggregate development expenditure in the open
mode (as if the closed mode were ruled out exogenously). The three parameter values are
λ = 0 (EK = 0.5, g(1)/g(0) = 1), λ = 3 (EK = 0.28, g(1)/g(0) = 0.05), and λ = 7
(EK = 0.14, g(1)/g(0) = 0.0009).
Figure 3 shows the relationship between IPR protection, proxied by (1− L) , and the
aggregate development expenditures for diﬀerent values of λ, averaged out over K ∈ [0, 1]
according to the density function (15). We present the equilibrium level of investment where
the mode of disclosure is chosen as described above, i.e., on the basis of higher ex interim
joint surplus of the RU cum her licensee DUi. In order to understand the incremental
importance of the eﬀects (C) and (D), we also plot the total development expenditures,
summed across DU1 and DU2, in the open mode (as if the closed mode were exogenously
ruled out).
Let us first consider the eﬀect of IPR protection on the licensed and non-licensed DUs’
development expenditures in the open mode. As shown in Figure 3, the eﬀects (A) and
(B) can only produce either a monotonic (increasing for low λ, decreasing for high λ) or a
U-shaped relationship (for intermediate values of λ).22
Once we consider both modes of disclosure and allow for the eﬀects (C) and (D), the
relationship between [E1 +E2] and (1 − L) changes qualitatively, especially for low and
intermediate values of λ, when high values of K are still quite likely, and low levels of IPR.
Indeed, the eﬀects (C) and (D) are driven by the closed mode which exists and dominates
the open sales whenK and L are high. This explains the inverted U-shaped relationship for
suﬃciently high λ. For suﬃciently high λ, high knowledge levels are very unlikely, so the
closed mode is irrelevant for all IPR protection levels above a certain threshold; investment
coincides with that in the open mode, and therefore declines as IPR protection increases.
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When IPR protection is very low, the parties choose the closed mode for a broader range
of K (i.e. bK(L) is lower). As IPR protection rises from very low levels, the close mode
becomes infeasible at very low knowledge level, the mode switching eﬀect (D) is very strong
and the aggregate development expenditures increase. This eﬀect is especially important
for λ ≥ 7 where the lower levels of knowledge are very likely.
Total development expenditures can be higher with the closed mode when the latter
is relatively eﬃcient. This eﬀect is important when higher levels of K are more likely as
when λ ∈ [0, 3] and IPR protection is low (1 − L) ≤ 0.5. Nevertheless, for λ = 3, an
inverted-U-shaped relationship obtains over a large range of IPR protection. In contrast,
for λ = 0, the closed mode eﬀect (C) dominates for lower levels of (1 − L), leading to a
U-shaped relationship between IPR protection and total development expenditures.
To summarize, the shape of the relationship between (E1 + E2) and (1 − L) varies
substantially with the ex ante distribution of knowledge K. While for high λ (λ ≥ 7)
the relationship has an inverted-U shape, in the case of an uniform distribution (λ = 0)
the relationship is actually U-shaped. For intermediate values of parameters (λ = 3) the
graph is a superposition of an U-shape and an inverted-U-shape. Our numerical example
is highly stylized, so it is hard to judge which values of parameters are realistic. Still, we
may presume that the range λ ∈ [3, 7] is somewhat consistent with observed characteristics
of modern R&D (see Teece, 2000).
6 Corporate venturing and ex ante incentives
In this Section we study the role of RU’s ex interim financial constraints, and possible ex
ante assignment of control rights over her to one of the two DUs. As argued above, RU’s
financial constraint may become binding ex interim, when her incentive compatible equity
stake sPc is suﬃciently high. This results in potential ex interim ineﬃciency: there may
arise a situation where the joint surplus is higher in the closed mode Tc > To but the licensee
DUi prefers the open mode. This disagreement occurs whenever (To − Fo) > (Tc − sPc) .
If RU had deep pockets, she would pay DUi at the interim stage for forgoing the open
mode option, but since RU is cash constrained the ex interim eﬃcient mode can only be
implemented if she has some external source of financing.
First, we consider a situation where the parties ex ante agree on RU remaining indepen-
dent. In this case the RU may overcome this ex interim ineﬃciency using outside venture
capital. The second scenario is corporate venturing where RU can commit ex ante to
remain financially constrained ex interim through giving control rights to DUi.
If RU is independent and requires external financing ex interim, she may join forces
with a venture capitalist (VC) who will pay I = [(To − Fo)− (Tc − sPc)] to DUi ex interim
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in exchange of I/Pc shares out of the s shares of revenue accruing to its coalition with the
RU.23It is crucial that such a VC is able to make sure that RU acts in the interest of the
RU-VC coalition and does not disseminate knowledge to DUj even though she only has a
stake of s − I/Pc in DUi revenues. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption: VC
is not a regular financial intermediary, but a specialized entity with reputational concerns,
which can prevent opportunistic behavior by its coalition partner RU.
The second scenario is corporate venturing. Ex ante, RU and DUi agree that RU will
cede control rights to DUi. We do not assume alienability of human capital nor memory
erasing technologies. The transfer of control rights implies only that RU’s outside financing
can be vetoed by DUi. Also, RU is required to start negotiations with DUi first and is
not allowed to sell to a competing DUj exclusively in a closed sale with a share in DUj’s
revenues (in the closed mode, the disclosure of knowledge to DUj cannot be tracked but any
revenue sharing contract is by definition verifiable). It is easy to see that under corporate
venturing, DUi could credibly veto a RU-VC alliance. One way to commit to this veto is
to sign a contract ex ante that if RU signs any share contracts with outsiders, her partner
VC must pay DUi a suﬃciently high penalty for a breach of her ex ante agreement with
DUi.
24
As corporate venturing rules out relaxing RU’s financial constraint, it may result in
knowledge licensing via the open mode when the closed mode is ex interim eﬃcient. Why
would parties want to sign such a contract? The reason is that although the independent
RU scenario is eﬃcient ex interim, it may provide perverse incentives ex ante. As shown
above, unlike Fo or Tc/2 the value of RU’s revenue share sPc is decreasing in K. Therefore
the RU’s financial constraint Fc ≥ sPc tends to bind at low levels of K. By forcing open
mode sales via corporate venturing for such knowledge levels, DUi may indeed create ex
interim ineﬃciencies. However, he may also improve RU’s ex ante incentives to invest costly
eﬀort in research which is more likely to produce higher levels of K.
Whether corporate venturing is eﬃcient ex ante depends on the relative strength of
these ex ante and ex interim eﬀects. Let us consider a simple example where RU can
choose one of two eﬀort levels: high or low. The high level of eﬀort costs e dollars more,
but also produces higher knowledge K = KH ex interim with probability 1. The low eﬀort
produces only K = KL with probability 1, where KL < KH .
Suppose that in both states the closed mode dominates the open mode: T kc > T
k
o ,
k = L,H; in the high state RU’s financial constraint is not binding, while in the low state
sLPLc > max{TLc /2, TLc − TLo + FLo }. The latter implies sLPLc > FLo so the RU’s financial
constraint is binding in the low state. Then corporate venturing matters in the low state,
and will aﬀect the RU’s payoﬀ if a lower level of eﬀort is chosen ex ante.
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K = KL K = KH
K 0.33 0.5
L 0.8 0.8
To 0.108 0.141
Tc 0.140 0.246
Fo 0.037 0.063
To − Fo 0.071 0.078
Tc/2 0.070 0.123
s 0.4 0.130
sPc 0.08 0.056
Tc − sPc 0.06 0.189
I 0.011 −
sPc − I 0.069 −
Table 1: A numerical example where corporate venturing is ex ante eﬃcient
Proposition 3 Corporate venturing will strictly increase RU’s research eﬀort if
max{THc /2, FHo }− e < sLPLc − IL and
max{THc /2, FHo }− e > FLo . (16)
Corporate venturing will be adopted ex ante if the change in research eﬀort is cost-eﬃcient:
(THc − e)− TLc > 0. (17)
Since the closed mode is more eﬃcient in the low state, sLPLc −IL = FLo +TLc −TLo > FLo ,
the conditions (16) are consistent for some eﬀort costs e.
Table 1 describes a numerical example where the conditions above are satisfied for a
range of e. We consider the case with L = 0.8, KL = 1/3, and KH = 1/2. Indeed, the
conditions (16) and (17) imply e > 0.123 − 0.069 = 0.054, e < 0.123 − 0.037 = 0.086,
and e < 0.246− 0.14 = 0.106. Hence, for all e ∈ (0.054, 0.086) corporate venturing strictly
increases ex ante welfare and will therefore be an equilibrium outcome.
In this example, corporate venturing allows DUi to commit to force the choice of the
open mode when K is low and RU’s financial constraint is binding sPc > max{Fo, Tc/2}.
Since corporate venturing makes the commitment credible, RU expects to suﬀer from the
open mode, and therefore prefers to choose a higher level of eﬀort whereby her financial
constraint does not bind. Once the high eﬀort level is taken ex ante, corporate venturing
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actually becomes irrelevant ex interim (financial constraint is not binding in the high state);
hence corporate venturing does not even result in ex interim ineﬃciency. The latter is an
artefact of the assumption that high eﬀort level rules out the low state with probability 1.
If the low knowledge state occurred under high eﬀort with a positive but lower probability,
the results in Proposition 3 could be easily generalized; but corporate venturing would now
create a non-trivial probability of ex interim ineﬃciency.
7 Concluding remarks
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D). Research
Unit (RU) produces non-verifiable knowledge that has no market value per se but it can
be used by Development Units (DUs) to create a marketable product. Due to the non-rival
nature of knowledge, there is a risk that after disclosing to one DU, RU will further disclose
the information to a competing DU. We consider two alternative mechanisms that create
RU’s commitment to exclusive disclosure: the ‘open sale’ based on patenting the interim
knowledge, and the ‘closed sale’ where precluding further sales requires the RU to obtain
a share in the licensed DU’s post-invention revenues.
An open or patented sale provides legal support for exclusive disclosure, but it also
involves leakage of a certain portion of the knowledge to the public in the process of filing
a patent application. A closed sale helps to reduce such leakage, but the need for giving
away a share of post-invention revenues to RU weakens the licensee DU’s incentives to
invest in development. We explicitly model the extensive form bargaining in both modes of
disclosure, and find that the parties are more likely to choose the closed mode if the interim
knowledge is very valuable and intellectual property rights are not very well protected.
We also use our framework to model corporate venturing as an ex ante transfer of
ex interim decision rights. We show that although corporate venturing may reduce RU’s
flexibility and create ex interim ineﬃciencies, it may strengthen RU’s ex ante incentives
to generate knowledge when she is financially constrained. Thus corporate venturing may
lead to a Pareto improvement for her and the licensee DU ex ante, via enhanced knowledge
creation.
We do not obtain unambiguous welfare implications. Our model shows that there is no
uniform ranking of the two knowledge disclosure modes even in terms of overall research
eﬀort induced. We find that both the magnitude of research and development expenditures
across the modes of knowledge disclosure, and the relationship between overall knowledge-
development eﬀorts and the strength of intellectual property rights protection, depend
qualitatively on the ex ante distribution of interim knowledge levels. Also, the impact of
ex ante research eﬀort on the distribution of interim knowledge levels serves to determine
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whether corporate venturing improves welfare or not.
For simplicity’s sake we have assumed that a fixed share of knowledge is leaked in
both open and closed modes. Our results would not change qualitatively if the share or
probability of leakage is diﬀerent in the two modes of disclosure. One can assume that
while regulatory policies that weaken IPR protection may augment the leakage in the open
mode, the degree of knowledge leakage in the closed mode is a benchmark technological
parameter and is therefore unaﬀected by such legal changes.25Therefore, IPR-related regu-
latory policies should not aﬀect the surplus in the closed mode. The relationship between
IPR protection and R&D expenditures could thus still have an inverted U-shape, since the
latter is driven by the eﬀects of leakage on overall investment in the open mode combined
with switching from the closed mode to the open mode as IPR protection increases. If the
closed mode of knowledge sales matters a great deal in overall R&D activity, then our re-
sults would also be consistent with Kortum and Lerner (1998), who suggest that legislated
changes in the protection provided via patents may have little impact on research related
expenditures.
Throughout our paper, except in Section 6 on corporate venturing, we have deempha-
sized the incentives of first-stage Research Units to generate knowledge, and the impact
of increased IPR protection thereon. In part that is because the qualitative impact of
(potential) leakage on RU’s payoﬀs can diﬀer substantially depending on her chosen mode
of knowledge sale. RU’s payoﬀ is decreasing in the leakage parameter in open sales, but
possibly increasing in leakage in closed sales. Furthermore, even if increased IPR protection
augments RU’s interim payoﬀs, and enhances her incentives for creation of higher levels of
interim knowledge, it is far from clear that such an eﬀect would generate an inverted U-
shaped relationship between overall R&D expenditures and the strength of IPR protection.
As we have shown above, such a relationship may easily result from endogenous private
choices over modes of licensing of diﬀerent levels of interim knowledge.
Our model may also be extended to analyze employment relationship in knowledge-
intensive firms. There are obvious analogies between corporate researchers and RUs in our
model, and between their (current and potential) employers and DUs. Yet, the roles of
intra-firm authority, non-competing clauses, and non-pecuniary rewards (career concerns)
as incentives to preclude opportunistic disclosure provide interesting avenues for further
research.
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Notes
1. An early theoretical argument for such a relationship between IPR protection in the
form of patent length and the expected value of resulting inventions was provided by
Hurwitz and Lie (1996). Sakakibara and Brensetter (2001) have analyzed Japanese
evidence on this issue, based on the impact of patent reforms.
2. Some scholars have claimed that reforms in US patenting law, and its improved
implementation by a specialized appeals court, are responsible for a dramatic increase
(doubling or more) in US patent registrations and small firm research expenditures
over the 1990s (see Gallini, 2002). The study of Kortum and Lerner (1998) disagrees
with this view. They find that patenting rates increased nearly as much in sectors
outside those directly aﬀected by “stronger” patent law, which recognized innovations
such as novel software or genetically altered life forms for patents. They attribute the
increase in patenting to enhanced emphasis on and funding for applied research, often
leading to more numerous marginal contributions. In sectors such as biotechnology,
this might have been spurred by major discoveries in earlier years.
3. As Gallini (2002) notes, based on the paper of Jensen and Thursby (2001), the impact
of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 — which empowered universities to retain patent rights
to their innovations developed with federal funds, and oﬀer exclusive licenses for
the commercial development thereof — on stimulating technology transfer to the for-
profit sector is “compelling”. Others have argued that interim knowledge transfers
to multiple developers, via non-exclusive knowledge licenses or greater disclosure in
patents for example, may do more to stimulate inventions. In our model, for a subset
of interim knowledge levels overall developer surplus may indeed be enhanced by
disclosing interim knowledge fully to both DUs, but we show that the RU’s reduced
bargaining power in such multiple licensing will lead her to prefer exclusive licenses.
Teece (2000) concurs with this view, in a less formal way. See also Bolton and
Whinston (1993).
4. After writing the first draft of this paper, we have also become aware of Lai et al.
(2003), who deal with similar issues, albeit in a diﬀerent framework. In particu-
lar, they exogenously parameterize the eﬀect of opportunistic disclosure on RU’s and
DUs’ ex post revenues, while we explicitly model a development race. Another related
paper is Baccara and Razin (2002) where the original innovator has to share infor-
mation with his employees who could potentially leak his knowledge. The innovator
appropriates a substantial part of the surplus, because he can threaten the employees
with the loss of ex post monopoly rents. While our closed mode of knowledge sales
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is based on a similar idea, unlike Baccara and Razin we model our RU’s stake in her
licensee DU’s ex post revenue as being contractible.
5. By considering revenue rather than net profit sharing contracts between the RU and a
DU, we eliminate concerns such as those raised in Anand and Galetovic (2000), of the
possibility of a DU inflating his reported research expenditure for a given development
project among its many such ventures to “hold up” an RU.
6. There is an extensive literature on contracts between a venture capitalist (VC) and an
RU in the first-stage research process, which aid the VC in controlling RU’s incentives
regarding shirking and ineﬃcient continuation; see Cornelli and Yosha (2002). We
analyze a diﬀerent role for VC’s in Section 6 below.
7. Kortum and Lerner (2001) have examined evidence on the impact of venture capital
finance, including funding by corporate venturers, on the productivity of research
by their RUs and their patenting activities; see also Gompers and Lerner (1998) for
an exploration of corporate venturing. Hellman (2002) models RUs’ optimal choices
between independent vs corporate venture financing, based on (positive or negative)
synergies between their targeted final inventions and the corporates’ prior products.
8. All the bargaining among the RU and the two DUs in our model is carried out under
complete information, since we assume that a description of the knowledge K (that
leads to leakage of capability LK to its receiver, L ≤ 1) suﬃces to establish its level,
determining the maximum probability of second stage invention it could lead to. For
a model of bargaining over knowledge licenses under incomplete information about
the licensors’ knowledge level across two RU cum DUs, in which a large portion of
the first-best Pareto frontier across them is attainable without any delays, see the
recent paper of d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and Gerard-Varet (2000).
9. Earlier, Scotchmer and Green (1990) developed a two-stage model of cumulative
R&D, in which patenting (disclosure) of an interim innovation causes full leakage of
its implications for second-stage inventions to other RU cum DUs. They analyzed en-
dogenous choices of the timing of patenting under alternative IPR protection regimes,
and the optimality thereof, without explicitly considering the possibility of licensing
of such interim innovations.
10. In two subsequent papers, Anton and Yao have extended their analysis to Incomplete
interim information about RU’s knowledge level, in which partial disclosure of it
serves a costly signal thereof, as in Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983). In Anton and
Yao (2002), this occurs in the context of closed sales of interim knowledge by an RU,
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which are backed up by her warranties for its non-performance in the development
stage. Both patented and non-patented knowledge disclosures are considered in An-
ton and Yao (2004), with qualitative results related to those of our model. However,
these are derived in the context of RU cum DU firms, whose sole motive for disclosure
is to signal the levels of their realized ex post technological (cost) advantage to prod-
uct market rivals. Hence, knowledge licensing in their model only arises contingent
on successful patent-infringement lawsuits, for exogenously given (albeit plausible)
royalties.
11. The RU’s share may be quite substantial. Recently, a Japanese court enhanced the
reward of an inventor, holding a patent jointly with his ex-employer, from 20,000 to
20 billion yen (189 million dollars); see New York Times (2004).
12. A recent motion picture titled “The Paycheck,” based on a science-fiction story by
Phillip K. Dick, portrays a corporate researcher who is rewarded via cash and shares
in his firm, but also has his memory erased after each discovery to ensure its non-
disclosure to competitors, a technology that we rule out.
13. Dasgupta and Tao consider the possibility that a joint research venture may yield (as
well as its original goal) unanticipated opportunities for further inventions that are
asymmetric across its partners. They analyze the role of equity-based joint ventures
with an exit or sale option for each partner, which facilitates their bargaining over the
right to license the use of know-how developed in the joint venture in later inventions.
Tepperman considers a setting in which two DUs may combine their eﬀorts to develop
a patented technology, which is however subject to the threat of costly imitation by
the partner which is not initially assigned the property right to this patent. He shows
that it is not necessarily optimal for the partner whose development eﬀort is more
productive to own this property right, when more valuable inventions are more likely
to be imitated, especially when the imitation outcome is an Outside as opposed to
an Ongoing or Disagreement option, as modeled in De Meza and Lockwood (1998).
14. We use the symmetric Cobb-Douglas formulation for analytical tractability. Most our
qualitative results hold for any neoclassical p(K,E) with constant returns to scale.
15. We rule out patented sales to two DUs. One can show that in the resulting tripartite
bargaining (e.g., see Bolton and Whinston, 1993) this is always dominated from RU’s
point of view by an exclusive knowledge sale to one DU. The RU is better-oﬀ with the
exclusive sale, even when licensing to both DUs may increase total surplus. Indeed,
in the latter case RU only gets half of the total surplus, while under an exclusive sale
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two DUs compete a la Bertrand for a single license, modulo the DUs’ disagreement
option of development based on leaked knowledge. Details of this simple proof are
available upon request.
16. As L decreases, the potential reward to the RU from a clandestine second sale after
a closed “exclusive” sale increases, so that her temptation has to be countered (if it
is feasible) by an increased revenue share in her original licensee DU. This diminishes
this DU’s incentive for expending non-contractible inputs to enhance his probability
of successful second-stage development of RU’s interim knowledge. In contrast, in an
open sale decreased L reduces the non-licensee’s chosen “eﬀort”, in turn improving
the licensee’s incentive to expend eﬀort. The implications for the probabilities of sole
invention, which determine DUs’ chosen research expenditures, summed over both
DUs is ambiguous, and depend on the levels of K and L.
17. Until Section 6 we ignore RU’s ex interim financial constraints.
18. We need to evaluate the sign of Tc(K;L)−To(K;L) at K = bK(L). Substituting (13)
into (12) and (14), and using (5) we find that this expression is positive whenever
D(L) = 1− (1+L)2/16− (1−L bK(L))2/(1−L bK2(L))2 is positive. An analysis of the
sign of D0(L) shows that function D(L) is increasing if L < 0.68 and is decreasing
otherwise. Its maximum value is positive D(0.68) = 0.18 > 0. It is easy to check
that D(0) < 0 and D(1) < 0. Therefore there exist such L1 ∈ (0, 0.68) and and
L2 ∈ (0.68, 1) that D(L) > 0 for L ∈ (L1, L2) and D(L) < 0 if L < L1 or L > L2.
Simple numerical calculations yield L1 = 0.25 and L2 = 0.91.
19. If the open mode is suboptimal (To < Tc), then the outside option can only bind for
one party. Note that we treat DUi’s open mode payoﬀ as being an outside option
rather than a disagreement option. The precise division of the surplus Tc in such a
sale is unimportant for our qualitative results, however.
20. One can easily show that dEo/dL > 0 whenever L > Λ(K) ≡ (3K−1)K−2(3−K)−1.
The right hand side Λ(K) increases with K for all K ∈ [0, 1] with Λ(1/3) = 0 and
Λ(1) = 1. Hence for all K ≤ 1/3, eﬀort Eo is decreasing in L, while for K ∈ (1/3, 1)
eﬀort is U-shaped with the minimum point at L = Λ(K).
21. We need to determine the sign of Eo − Ec at K = bK(L), where Ec = P 2c /(2K) =
K(1− s)2/2 is the development eﬀort in the closed mode. The sign is positive when-
ever
h
(1− L bK(L))2 + L(1− bK(L))2i /(1−L bK2(L))2 > (1− (1 +L)/4)2. The latter
inequality holds. The right-hand side is below 9/16 for all L ∈ [0, 1], while the mini-
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mum value of the left-hand side is 0.83. Indeed, the left-hand side decreases in L for
all L < 0.52 and then increases in L; at L = 0.52 the left-hand side equals 0.83.
22. As discussed above, for a given K eﬀects (A) and (B) produce either decreasing or
U-shaped relationship. However, when K is high the minimum point of the U-shape
of Eo with regard to (1 − L) is so close to 1 − L = 0 that the relationship is an
increasing one for most of parameter values. Once we average out over K, we obtain
an increasing function when λ is low and therefore high levels of K are more likely.
23. We assume that venture capital market is perfectly competitive so VC makes zero
profit in equilibrium. The assumption that I can be financed without distortions is
compatible with the prohibitive costs of financing independent development by RU:
the investment in development may be much larger than I.
24. Once DUi has observed the RU-VC coalition, the DU has incentives to impose the
penalty so that VC’s participation constraint does not hold. Anticipating this, VC
will not join forces with the RU. We rule out the possibility of RU asking DUi to rene-
gotiate the penalty before contacting the VC. We assume that for VC’s reputational
constraints to be eﬀective, the RU-VC coalition must be formed before negotiations
on licensing — otherwise there is a risk of opportunistic leakage of LK to the other
DUj by a VC whom RU approaches ex interim.
25. For example, the choice of Process rather than Product licensing in Indian patent law
for pharmaceutical innovations, prior to her joining the WTO, probably facilitated
the development of alternative processes for the same final product, by requiring
patent applicants to disclose more fully the original processes for manufacturing their
products. In contrast, closed licenses for manufacturing these products are likely
to have resulted in similar levels of disclosure about innovators’ processes only after
agreement on royalties.
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